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CAN MEMORY ERASURE CONTRIBUTE TO 
A VIRTUOUS TEMPERING OF EMOTIONS?
ABSTRACT
The paper deals with a perspective of Christian philosophy on artificial 
memory erasuse for psychotherapeutic purposes. Its central question is 
whether a safe and reliable technology of memory erasure, once it is 
available, would be acceptable from a Christian ethics point of view. The 
main facet of this question is related to the Christian ethics requirement 
of contrition for the past wrongs, which in the case of memory erasure 
of particulary troubling experiences and personal choices would not be 
possible. The paper argues that there are limits to the ethical significance 
of contrition in the writings of the leading Christian fathers on the theme 
(e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas), where excessive suffering and inability to 
forgive oneself for one’s actions is an impediment to the achivement of 
tranquility of mind and spiritual redemption, rather than a prerequisite 
for it. The paper thus concludes that there is no hindrance in principle 
from the Christian ethics point of view to pursuing a voluntary and 
selective memory erasure as a psychotherapeutic technique once a fully 
adequate technology is available. 
There are numerous practical arguments in favor of artificial memory erasure. 
Victims of traumatic events such as genocide or rape are likely to benefit from 
a partial memory erasure or modification by being able to integrate their ‘life 
script’ more quickly and effectively. Additionally, many of the somatic conse-
quences of the stress associated with traumatic memories might be avoided: 
thus memory erasure might help prevent the risk of psycho-somatic illnesses 
ranging from high bloodpressure to cancer.1 Finally, memory erasure might 
improve the quality of life of many victims of trauma, with all of the social, 
economic and moral consequences such improvement would bring.
1  In her moving autobiography Susan Brison (1997) narrates all of the personal iden-
tity issues arising from her own ‘disruption of life narrative’ after she had been raped 
while hiking in the South of France and left for dead in a cave. The social conditions 
for the reintegration of ‘life narrative’ based on Brison’s and similar accounts were dis-
cussed by Jaqui Poltera (2010).
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On the other hand, arguments against memory erasure mainly revolve around 
its impact on the authenticity and completeness of personal identity. If the 
erasure of some experiences from one’s conscious autobiography would com-
promise one’s ‘proper’ personal identity, memory erasure might blur the au-
tonomy of future decisions and reduce the quality and sustainability of any 
emotional ‘closure’ achieved after trauma. If such closure is not achieved by 
‘re-processing’ the traumatic experiences and integrating them in one’s per-
ception of one’s life as a whole, but by simply deleting some of the particular-
ly intractable experiences, the sense of peace so achieved might be easily de-
stroyed by similar experiences in the future.
While the issue of any impact memory erasure might have on the quality 
of emotional closure is an empirical one, I argue here that memory erasure, 
if voluntary, does not militate against personal autonomy and is in principle 
compatible with Christian values. Furthermore, I argue that such memory de-
letion or modification can enhance personal autonomy by allowing the person 
to freely choose what kind of person one wishes to become. Thus I will argue 
that, on philosophical grounds alone, memory erasure should be freely avail-
able to everyone once a safe technology is fully developed.
From a Christian point of view contrition plays a key role in character devel-
opment. Whilst the emotional and volitional aspects of contrition are equally 
important, and the certain ‘emphatic’ nature of repentance is expected, what 
really matters in the context of development of Christian virtues and character 
is the person’s ability to leave the sinful ways behind and change their ways. The 
concept of forgiveness, apart from its obvious soteriological meaning, plays a 
crucial functional role of encouraging the moving on after the confession and 
repentance. The Greek term for contrition is particularly illustrative here: the 
term ‘metanoia’ literally means a ‘transformation’, suggesting a change of life 
and personal values (Walden 2010). The Christian promise of forgiveness is a 
powerful encouragement to move on and transform the past. Perhaps the most 
often cited example from the Scriptures is Jesus’s being anointed by a sinful 
women (Luke 7.36−50), where the repentance shown by the woman is not em-
phatic, but peaceful and implicit, full of hope, as is the generosity of Jesus. Only 
when questioned, Jesus makes it clear that he not only knows her past, but has 
released her from her sins. Her actions are an example of humbleness in ask-
ing for forgiveness and of faith in accepting it. 
The dominant understanding of contrition, which is well established in tra-
ditional theology of both the Eastern and Western Christianity, suggests that 
the amount of remorse and sorrow (thus emotional suffering) that arise from 
the recognition of one’s sins can well be excessive and detrimental to a person’s 
overall wellbeing (Aquinas 2007: 2569; St. Macarios of Egypt in Chrysostomos 
et al., 1988).  Aquinas writes:
Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby 
the sin is displeasing through being an offense against God, cannot be too great; 
even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased 
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the aforesaid displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, 
contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may be too 
great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding of the subject, and 
of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one’s duties; hence 
it is written (Rm. 12:1): “Let your sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg.: ‘Present your 
bodies ... a reasonable sacrifice’].” (Summa Theologiae, Third Part, Supplement, 
Question 3, Article 2 — Aquinas 2007: 2569).
Aquinas makes a difference between the sorrow arising from contrition 
which is connected with the feeling of guilt (displeasure ‘through being an of-
fense against God’), which, according to him, can never be too great, and the 
strictly emotional, ‘embodied’ part of that sorrow (‘the sensible sorrow’), which 
may be too great because the emotions triggered by the sin might compromise 
the body and the person’s physical and mental health. Indeed, one of the ma-
jor problems encountered by Christian pastors is the inability of those who 
repent to ‘move on’ because of a persistent sense of guilt which is unaffected 
by absolution after confession. Especially when the events, including one’s 
own wrongdoings, are traumatic, sometimes they tend to ‘stick’ in the person’s 
mind, thus making it difficult for the person to believe that one is forgiven and 
to muster the strength to focus on the future (Worthington 2006, Aten et al. 
2011). All of these difficulties militate against the person’s autonomy more than 
a circumspect practice of memory erasure would. There is a common under-
standing of ethics, and especially religious ethics, which ties the rationality of 
beliefs to the process whereby these beliefs have been acquired, rather than 
to the evidence that supports or refutes the belief (Jung 2017). While the fact 
that memory erasure might disrupt the continuity of a process of acquisition 
of (moral) beliefs might on the surface make the practice morally suspect, on 
the substantive level, responsible memory erasure has the capacity to address 
the hindrances to a person’s future moral agency which arise from their inai-
bility to deal with past problems. The problems in dealing with a sense of guilt 
occur on the level of what Augustine calls ‘sorrow in the reason’. On this level, 
the sense of guilt may destroy one’s life narrative without immediately, or visi-
bly, causing an emotional stir that would be significant enough to compromise 
the body in the short term. After all, many people who attend  counseling do 
not show any symptoms of psychological, and much less physical problems, 
but have unresolved issues that make them feel permanently ‘stuck’ and pro-
foundly threaten their identity, ability to mobilize their creative energy, or 
create close and intimate relationships.
The counseling techniques that address this issue focus specifically on re-
ducing the sense of guilt, rather than dealing with emotions directly. They are 
close to cognitive and behavioural models of counseling and take the form of 
educated discussions about the ethics of the Scriptures and a practical Chris-
tian ethics (Clinton and Ohlschlager 2002).
To show that autonomy is compatible with and, sometimes, increased by 
memory erasure, I argue that personal identity and personal autonomy do not 
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help define each other. I thus argue that a stable personal identity is not inter-
rupted by a prevailing heteronomy in decision-making. The sense of personal 
identity I rely on here is that of a ‘life narrative’. This is a common way in which 
most people perceive their identity and it has been persuasively argued for by 
a number of philosophers (Schechtman 1996, Ricoeur 1991, Nelson 2001, Hut-
to 2007, Dennett 1992, Brunner 2003, Kircher and David 2003, Rudd 2009, 
Taylor 1989, Wollheim 1984, Woody 2004). Critiques of the narrative view of 
identity, on the other hand, have mainly touched on the metaphysics of per-
sons rather than targeting the functional appropriateness and intuitiveness of 
narrative as ‘autobiographic identity’ (e.g. Strawson 2004).
Memory in the Narrative Identity
The narrative concept of personal identity is the self-perception based on an 
autobiographical life story, which is laden with values and interpretations that 
the person considers vital to how she sees herself and the world. According to 
Marya Schechtman, the personal narrative must satisfy two basic conditions: 
(i) the articulation condition (it must be reasonably intelligible and portray a 
comprehensible life story), and (ii) the reality condition (the narrative must be 
consistent with ‘basic observational facts and interpretative facts’ (Schechtman 
1996: 114, 120). By satisfying the two conditions the personal narrative allows 
people to relate to each other by acknowledging the same type of reality that 
connects them. In times of identity crisis it is usually this type of perception of 
self-identity that is damaged or threatened, and its re-articulation or re-building 
(e.g. by psychotherapy or counseling) often helps restore the person’s self-con-
fidence and ability to project a healthy first-person perspective on the present 
and the future (Fatić 2013). The narrative concept of identity is appropriate 
for my present purpose simply because it is prima facie intuitively appealing 
in light of the ordinary way in which we tend to define who we are: by ‘narrat-
ing’ the experiences, values and attitudes that we believe define us as persons.
Some traumatic experiences clearly have the capacity to destroy one’s per-
sonal narrative. We all have certain concepts of who we are and becoming the 
victim of extreme violence, for example, can shatter those concepts. Whether or 
not the personal narrative can be reconstructed through psychotherapy and/or 
counseling is doubtful, and even if this is possible, it can never be guaranteed. 
Thus we are left with the possibility that a once flourishing personal identity 
could be damaged or altered by arbitrary victimization which the person will 
have physically survived.
If there was a ready technology to actually effect memory modification, some 
people might choose to erase or modify their memories in response to expe-
riences the memory of which threatens their sense of identity and even men-
tal health. Assuming that memory erasure involves elements of autobiograph-
ic memory which are significant for one’s development as a person, and not 
just irrelevant memories such as having read a newspaper or paid a bill, the 
narrative identity is likely to be modified by loss of memory. If I was able to 
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delete the memory of a conflict or a period of suffering that marked a signifi-
cant portion of my life experience, or of a trauma that has made me reflect on 
fundamental values and relationships with others, my personal story will ipso 
facto change. Strictly speaking I will no longer be the same person that I was 
while I still had these deeply challenging experiences. Thus it seems that the 
idea of memory deletion militates against the continuity of personal narrative 
in its linear, continuous form that tends to be associated with a highly func-
tional and integrated persona.
Memory and Autonomy
The situation with the relationship between autobiographic memory and per-
sonal autonomy is different, and this has important logical consequences for 
the relationship between autonomy and personal identity. Unlike the concept 
of personal identity as a (preferably relatively linear) narrative, which is fun-
damentally diachronic (it is partially defined by a continuum in time and thus 
depends on memories), autonomy is essentially synchronic: it marks decisions 
that are made ‘here and now’. Autonomy is not defined by previous decisions 
or experiences. Thus autonomy is possible for different people who make dif-
ferent decisions in the same situation, as much as for the same person who 
makes different decisions in the same circumstances at various points in time. 
While the continuity of person in terms of the narrative requires, as Schecht-
man points out, a certain consistency, autonomy does not: it is possible to make 
contradictory decisions, arising from contrasted values, all of which are ful-
ly autonomous. Trivially, if I take position A on a theoretical problem at mo-
ment x, I may equally autonomously, based on my own contemplation of the 
issues involved, take position not-A on the same problem at moment y. There 
are no grounds for challenging the autonomy of any of the two contradictory 
positions on the grounds that they are contradictory or lack synchronic con-
tinuity. Depending on the arguments and circumstances involved, however, 
there may be grounds for challenging my intellectual identity and/or integri-
ty, e.g. if such changes reflect contradictory values against a relatively stable 
background of other relevant assumptions. 
On a more controversial level, imagine a woman who at young age was a 
pornographic actress, but subsequently decides to become quite conservative, 
marry a conservative spouse and raise her children in a traditional way. The 
circumstances force her to keep her past from her family and friends, and the 
revelation of that past threatens to shatter the life she has now chosen for her-
self. She is understandably so troubled by her autobiographic memories that she 
decides to try to forget her youth. If her past is discovered, clearly all kinds of 
moral issues would come into the open with her husband: ranging from ‘who 
she really is’ to respect of his dignity and right to know relevant facts about 
her to the sincerity of her conservative values. This type of situation has been 
known to have presented itself in counseling and more often than not the out-
come was divorce and suffering for all parties concerned. 
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Imagine now that the woman has the option to safely erase memories from 
her past, that indeed this is technologically feasible, and that she freely chooses 
to do so in a well-informed manner. Subsequently she is able to live her life as 
though she has always been the person she is now. Does this decision under-
mine her personal autonomy?
There appears to be no philosophical reason why her decision to erase the 
memories could not be construed as a clear and autonomous expression of her 
authentic value-position towards the decisions she had (perhaps fully auton-
omously) made in the past. Imagine, finally, that the woman is confronted by 
her husband who happens to find out the truth: in this case he would know 
more about her past than she would, and her decision to erase the memories 
would bear clear witness to her sincerity of belief and her ultimate rejection 
of her previous ‘identity’. In this context she would appear to have acted in a 
way similar to deciding to take drugs in order to ‘remove’ an illness from the 
body. In a sense, the autonomous decision to remove the memories at least 
partly removes the presumably negative moral value attributed to decisions 
taken earlier in life. Thus memory erasure makes it possible to both function-
ally and, to some extent, morally reconstruct one’s identity.
The decision to remove some of the memories, and thus interrupt the con-
tinuity of the person she once was is not in principle different, with regard to 
autonomy, from a decision to change one’s behavior, thus trying to factually 
‘become a different person’. The difference is clear in terms of continuity of 
persons: if one changes one’s behavior to the level of unrecognizability, thus 
desiring to appear as a completely ‘new person’ (e.g. by changing one’s temper 
or abandoning a bad habit, such as drug use or cigarette smoking), one remains 
the same person one was and only appears different because one’s behavior 
changes. However, if one decides to make an incision into one’s memories, 
thus cutting out a part of one’s life narrative, then in a real sense one modifies 
one’s personal identity. This interruption to the continuity of person would 
occur even if there is little behavior change, just as in the former case the con-
tinuity of persons would persist even with a most radical behavior change. 
However, from the point of view of autonomy of decision-making, there is 
no difference between the two cases. If the means are available to treat trou-
ble memories in the same way as an illness, and such decisions are voluntary 
and well informed, then there are no grounds to argue that memory erasure 
diminishes personal autonomy.
Furthermore, there are convincing grounds to argue that memory erasure 
in such cases in fact re-enforces autonomy, by preventing situations where, de-
spite the transformation of values and self-perceptions, the person would re-
main imprisoned by past experiences which she rejects, but they nevertheless 
stubbornly determine her narrative. Voluntary memory erasure is both eman-
cipatory and revitalizing for the sense of self-invention that lies at the core of 
our perception of personal autonomy.
The argument presented here depicts memory erasure as merely a radi-
cal form of personality enhancement. Philosophical arguments have recently 
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been put forward in favour of a compulsory use of drugs to enhance the per-
sonalities of entire communities. Such personality enhancement may be seen 
as necessary in order to avoid  ‘the ultimate harm’, which can range from a sit-
uation where life is no longer worth living because of inter-personal conflicts 
to the obliteration of life on the planet by war (Savulescu, Persson 2008, 2013). 
Others have argued that personality enhancement can only be a feasible op-
tion if it is voluntary, because only in such a way do personal autonomy and 
the moral quality of actions fully survive (Rakić 2014).
The idea of memory erasure is usually seen as being a more ‘core issue’ 
than e.g. the propensity for empathy or solidarity, which according to some 
research might to some extent be influenced by drugs such as oxytocin (Ro-
drigues et al. 2009, Wu N. et al. 2012). However, from the point of view of 
personal autonomy, there is no difference between memory deletion and, for 
example, empathic personality enhancement. Assuming that this becomes 
possible, a person might decide to have her memories erased in the same way 
as one might decide to take a drug in order to feel greater empathy for others. 
There is, however, a structural difference between the two in that memory 
erasure is entirely self-referential. One decides to become more empathetic 
because this will benefit others, and only secondarily would the same deci-
sion, if taken by others, benefit the agent herself. The reference in personal-
ity enhancement in the context of preventing the ultimate harm is primari-
ly to collective well-being. On the other hand, memory deletion, if possible, 
would be primarily (not exclusively) a self-referenced decision: one decides 
to delete or modify one’s own memories in order to improve one’s own sense 
of identity and integrity, and this only secondarily impacts others (e.g. the 
family, in the cited example). In this sense, while being a more ‘core issue’ 
than the usual forms of personality enhancement, memory erasure conduces 
to autonomy because of its ability to consolidate one’s identity in essentially 
self-referential context and with enormous  emancipatory potential for the 
free self-reinvention of personality.
Another difference between memory-erasure as a form of personality-en-
hancement and the use of medication to increase empathy or inter-personal 
bonding is that memory-erasure involves the ultimate negative value judgment 
of one’s own experiences and thus part of the past: this judgment is so radical 
that the experiences are deemed totally unacceptable from the point of view of 
one’s current life-plans and value system, thus they must be erased. The abil-
ity to make ultimate judgments is predicated on a strong moral subject, with 
clear concepts of the moral right and wrong. It is also additionally autonomous 
in the sense that it is not motivated by external pressures to ‘be good to oth-
ers’: one will not necessarily be a better person towards others once one erases 
one’s trouble memories, however one is likely to be a freer, more autonomous 
and happier person.  It is therefore in a sense improper to debate the avail-
ability of memory erasure on the level of social policy, which is currently the 
case with pharmacological moral, cognitive or mood enhancement. Memory 
erasure is much less relevant to social policy as it remains a highly individual 
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issue. However, it impacts directly the most traditional philosophical ques-
tions of what it means to have a good life and how far one is justified in going 
to secure a good life. While the very question of memory erasure does not in 
any way prejudice the question of what it is to have a good life, clearly it has 
the capacity to serve its achievement if it is made available as a free choice.
Is Memory Erasure Acceptable from the Point of View  
of Christian Ethics?
The most obvious problem with, or objection to the idea that one should have 
free choice to erase part of one’s life narrative (at least as it is understood in 
close connection with autobiographic memory) is the impact of such erasure 
on responsibility. It might be argued that the ability to deal with one’s past and 
to cast an adequate value-light on it is so integral to the Christian faith that 
removing unbearable aspects of the past, or those that threaten one’s present 
life-choices, falsifies the person’s Christian life’s authenticity.  
While arbitrary memory erasure certainly does become a legitimate target 
of this objection, a circumspect and responsible decision-making on when to 
erase memories, especially one that would be able to be procedurally mon-
itored, perhaps by ethics boards in hospitals, is vulnerable to the objection. 
While memory erasure, if freely available outside institutionalized controls, 
might be used out of a variety of motives, from a desire to avoid criminal 
prosecution or public acknowledgement of one’s moral responsibility for ac-
tions, to becoming an illegal ‘tranquilizer’ that could be offered on the black 
market, the specific context in which I advance the proposal of free memory 
erasure is not this. I suggest that, in situations that satisfy the criteria arising 
from the Christian view (which is obviously common to many other religions 
as well) of the desirability of human flourishing in the moral realm, and, re-
latedly, of human emancipation from own moral wrongdoing, memory era-
sure may be a perfectly acceptable tool for the achievement of these ends. In 
some situations repentance, both in its soteriological and in its related psy-
chological function, may be entirely impossible due to the person’s inability 
to deal with the past. 
The very concept of repentance (metanoia) implies not just the acceptance 
of guilt, but the volitional effort to systematically change one’s choices in the 
future (Nicodemos 1989).2 The moral or intellectual side is accompanied by 
the volitional aspect of repentance. However, the latter is not possible with-
out the emotional aspect, namely the ability of those who repent to overcome 
the anxiety or depression that often follow the moral recognition of wrongdo-
ing or sin and arrive at an emotional stage where they can change their ways, 
while achieving at least a minimally functional emotional equilibrium. If the 
2  St. Nikodemos is the author of the Orthodox version of the seminal work on ascet-
icism, Unseen Warfare, from the Venetian original written by the Catholic author Lo-
renzo Scupoli. He was canonized in 1955.
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emotions are so stirred up that the very thought of wrongdoing overwhelms 
the person to the stage that she is unable to think rationally and act decisive-
ly, repentance is practically impossible. 
Discussions of the emotional side of repentance in Christian scholarship of-
ten focus only on the emotions that follow the value-recognition of the wrong-
fulness of one’s actions. So according to Stephen Graham:
Repentance includes three elements – intellectual, emotional and volitional. 
The intellectual element involves a change in thought and an act of moral con-
science – recognition of sin, acceptance of guilt, and a realisation of the sin’s 
consequences. The emotional element includes a change of feelings. Contrary 
to the proverb that says, “Sinning is the best part of repentance,” we feel genu-
inely sorrowful and remorseful for our sin and our failure to meet moral stan-
dards. (Graham 2013: 3).
The above is but one part of the emotional identity or signature of repen-
tance. Without the ability to ‘react badly’ to our own wrongs it is almost im-
possible to consider one’s ‘metanoia’, or transformation, as genuine repentance. 
Between two people who ‘repent’ for the same deed, one of whom however 
expresses regrets without visible emotions, while fully following through with 
behavior change, while the other changes behavior to the same level, however 
expresses emotion of remorse, the latter will likely be considered by many as 
having ‘genuinely’ repented. In this sense, negative emotions may be consid-
ered definitive of true repentance. Cathechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) 
thus states: ‘Contrition is “sorrow of the soul and detestation for the sin com-
mitted, together with the resolution not to sin again’ (CCC 1451). The expres-
sion of emotions both lends credibility to the act of repentance and represents 
a way towards the development of Christian virtues (CCC 1770).
On the other hand, when the experiences or one’s own wrongdoings are so 
grave (in the mind of the persons themselves) that they cause extreme anxiety 
and instability, these emotions can in fact inhibit repentance unless the very 
act of repentance credibly promises to relieve the anxiety. The person from the 
example given earlier in the text might feel such anxiety because of her por-
nographic past, and may find her own actions so repulsive, that the act of full 
repentance might in fact be possible only if it comes with a promise of memory 
modification. In such situations, if the anxiety is caused by moral misconduct 
repentance should lead to emotional equilibrium, at least to an extent. With 
drastic emotional reactions caused by one’s own moral wrongs in the past, the 
functionality of one’s cognitive and volitional capacities could be, and often 
is, so impaired that only the promise of an immediate relief will facilitate the 
emotional ‘facing up’ to the totality of one’s guilt involved in the moral wrong. 
This, after all, is why people take tranquilizers, alcohol, or drugs to calm the 
emotional fury that is unleashed in them when they recollect some of the par-
ticularly ‘bad’ things that they have done in the past. There is no principled 
problem with repentance if the person takes tranquilizers in order to confess 
fully and retain sufficient calmness and cognitive functionality in order to 
CAN MEMORY ERASURE CONTRIBUTE266 │ AleksAndAr FAtić
complete the ‘turn’ of repentance: confession – metanoia as a lasting change 
of heart. However, the effect of tranquilizers passes away and the memories 
and emotions caused by them come back – sometimes with greater force than 
before. Furthermore, the person who takes tranquilizers prior to confession 
knows that they only have a temporary effect, and this affects her conviction 
in her own ability to put the experience behind her in a sustainable, permanent 
manner. Only too often sufferers of such moral nightmares confess, repent on 
the level of values and cognition, but then fall back into the trap of guilt, anx-
iety, depression, and sometimes psychosis. This makes the act of repentance 
incomplete as the leap of personal redemption, in this life too.
While memory erasure remains a controversial topic in bioethics, main-
ly with a view of its alleged impact on personal autonomy and responsibility, 
and a topic that has hardly been broached in Christian ethics, pharmacologi-
cal means to effect such erasure are advancing rapidly. Some recent research 
has suggested, at least tentatively, that the use of the popular drug used to treat 
cardio-vascular problems, propranolol, might affect the structuring of auto-
biographic memories, especially after traumatic events  (Pitman et al. 2002, 
Brunet et al. 2008, Henry et al. 2007). This is a common drug used by millions 
of people, and if adequate regimes of administration for the purpose of memory 
erasure or modification are developed it could be readily applied in this vein. 
This is particularly easy to imagine given that the decades of clinical usage of 
propranolol have established it as a relatively safe drug, with few side effects. 
At the same time, new pharmacological research is continuing along the ave-
nue of ‘moral enhancement’, which has become a fashionable topic in bioeth-
ics. Numerous studies have been published on the use of oxytocin for encour-
aging empathy and bonding, and the drug has been described as an agent of 
‘character improvement’ (Kosfeld et al. 2005, Domes et al. 2007, Feldman et 
al. 2007, Guastella et al. 2008, Neumann 2008). 
While from a Christian point of view (and from the point of view of tradi-
tional ethics) it is doubtful whether behavior enhancements such as these, if 
they can indeed be brought about by medication alone, really qualify as true 
‘moral’ or ‘character’ enhancements, memory erasure is different. It is an area 
where pharmacological interventions are morally less problematic than in en-
hancement projects per se, although dealing with memory modification or era-
sure links the discourses of therapy and enhancement. The reason is twofold: 
memory erasure is not subject to public policy, such as enhancement might 
be: the decision to erase memories in the delineated context is limited to the 
person’s own conviction that this is the only way to deal with the unacceptable 
past. It is thus a self-redeeming action with both therapeutic and enhancement 
consequences for the person. This decision, when made in a legitimate way 
(not in order to avoid criminal prosecution or for thrill, by using black market 
services, etc.) is entirely in accordance with Christian morality. Most impor-
tantly, it is a decision that not only leaves personal autonomy intact (although 
it admittedly impacts the continuity of person), but also has the capacity to 
enhance personal autonomy. Memory erasure achieves this by offering the 
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promise of liberation from the past and thus fostering greater confidence in 
lasting autonomous change, however difficult and emotionally upsetting might 
be the experiences one feels one must forget.
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Aleksandar Fatić
Da li brisanje sećanja može doprineti moralno poželjnom 
uravnoteživanju emocija?
Apstrakt
Tekst se bavi perspektivom hrišćanske filozofije na pitanje o veštačkom brisanju pamćenja u 
psihoterapeutske svrhe. Centralno pitanje oko koje se konstituiše argumentacija teksta je 
da li bi bezbedna i pouzdana tehnologija brisanja sećanja, onda kada bude raspoloživa, bila 
prihvatljiva sa tačke gledišta hrišćanske etike. Osnovna dimenzija ovog pitanja odnosi se na-
glašavanje pokajanja u hrišćanskoj etici. Kada je reč o brisanju sećanja na posebno mučna 
iskustva i lične izbore, takvo brisanje sećanja bi onemogućilo pokajanje. U tekstu se argu-
mentiše da postoje granice etičkog značaja pokajanja u spisima vodećih hrišćanskih očeva o 
ovoj temi (npr. Sv. Tome Akvinskog), te da oni preteranu patnju i nesposobnost da se oprosti 
sebi samo za sopstvene radnje opisuju kao prepreku za postizanje duševnog mira i duhov-
nog spasenja, a ne kao uslove za to spasenje. Tekst stoga zaključuje da nema u principu pre-
preke, sa hrišćanske tačke gledišta, za dobrovoljno i selektivno brisanje sećanja u svrhu psi-
hoterapije onda kada bude na raspolaganju potpuno adekvatna tehnologija za to. 
Ključne reči: hrišćanska etika, pokajanje, duševni mir, duhovno spasenje, patnja, pogrešni 
izbori u prošlosti, brisanje sećanja, psihoterapija
